From Kosovo to Karabakh : international responses to de facto states. by Caspersen, Nina
SÜDOSTEUROPA, 56 (2008) 1 
Nina Caspersen* 
From Kosovo to Karabakh:  
International Responses to De Facto States 
Abstract:  Both in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, the dominant international re-
sponse to de facto states, or quasi-states, has been one of isolation; they violate the 
principle of territorial integrity, they are often based on warfare, and the legitimacy of 
their frequently ethnically-based claims to independence is rejected. This article finds 
that pragmatism has occasionally led to some form of reluctant engagement, but this 
has been ad hoc and its depoliticised nature has been stressed. De facto states have 
been viewed solely through the lens of ethnicity and there has been insufficient under-
standing of internal dynamics. International policies for Kosovo have long impacted 
on the strategies adopted by other de facto states and recent developments have reig-
nited hopes for recognition. The US and the EU have rejected any talk of a legal prece-
dent, but Kosovoʹs recognition does have important political consequences; it intro-
duces a new dynamism into currently stalled peace processes. This could lead to a 
hardening of positions, but it could also positively impact on the internal dynamics of 
the de facto states. 
The recent recognition of Kosovoʹs independence has been followed with great 
interest in other de facto states whose leaderships hope that this case will set a 
precedent and hence increase their chance of international recognition.1 This in-
terpretation has been echoed by Russia in its fierce criticism of the decision by 
states such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France and 
Germany to accept Kosovoʹs unilateral declaration of independence. As Vladi-
mir Putin put it before the recognition,  
If someone believes that Kosovo should be granted full independence as a state, then 
why should we deny it to the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians?2  
                                                          
* Nina Caspersen, PhD, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Poli-
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1 De facto states, quasi-states, unrecognised states, pseudo states or separatist states 
are entities that have achieved de facto independence, often through warfare, but 
not international recognition; examples include Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, 
Northern Cyprus, Somaliland, Tamil Eelam, and Transnistria. 
2 Robert PARSONS, »Russia: Is Putin Looking To Impose Solutions To Frozen Con-
flicts?«, in: RFE/RL, 2 February 2006. 
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The states that recognised Kosovoʹs independence have, on the other hand, ar-
gued that Kosovo is unique and that its recognition, therefore, does not set a 
dangerous precedent which might encourage other secessionist movements. 
But even if it does not set a legal precedent it will have consequences of a more 
political nature; it affects the calculations made in other entities that have 
achieved de facto independence. The decision to recognise Kosovoʹs independ-
ence could be interpreted as signifying an important change in international at-
titudes to de facto states. These entities have commonly been seen as criminal-
ised, ethnic fiefdoms that constitute a threat to security; they have violated the 
principle of territorial integrity, and its internal substitute uti possidetis, and 
have mostly been regarded as pariahs with whom any form of engagement is 
ill-advised.  
This article examines international responses to de facto states in the Bal-
kans and the Caucasus; specifically Republika Srpska Krajina (Croatia), Repub-
lika Srpska (Bosnia-Herzegovina [henceforth Bosnia]), Abkhazia and South  
Ossetia (Georgia), Nagorno Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and Kosovo (Serbia, until 
recently). It finds that territorial integrity has been the guiding principle along 
with a strictly ethnically-based understanding of these entities. Pragmatism has 
in some cases ruled and de facto states have reluctantly been accepted as nego-
tiating partners and aid recipients, but this has been on an ad hoc basis and 
without clear direction. International responses have overall been characterised 
by a marked reluctance to engage and by a limited understanding of internal 
dynamics. With the recognition of Kosovo, a new possibility has emerged: 
could reluctant engagement be transformed into full-blown acceptance, or is 
Kosovo indeed a one-off? Such questions introduce a new fluidity into hitherto 
stalled peace processes since they are likely to impact not only on the strategies 
adopted by the de facto states but also on the willingness of their ʹparent statesʹ 
to compromise. The prospect of independence could lead to a hardening of po-
sitions on both sides but it could conceivably also have a positive impact on the 
internal dynamics of the entities and hence on the stalled peace processes.    
Self-Determination in a Time of Territorial Integrity 
Notwithstanding the many independent states that emerged from the collapse 
of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the recognition of new states remains a 
rare event, especially if independence is contested by the ʹparent stateʹ. Since 
1965, only five conflicts involving self-determination disputes resulted in inde-
pendence for substate entities. But even though the odds are against them, enti-
ties that have achieved de facto independence maintain an aspiration for inter-
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national recognition.3 However much we talk about globalisation, erosion of the 
state and the increasing irrelevance of territory, statehood remains the top 
prize; it legitimises the struggle, guarantees protection for the inhabitants and 
prestige and power for the leaders. Because, as Dov Lynch argues, in the inter-
national system, ʺthere are states and there is little elseʺ.4 The main argument 
for independence put forward by de facto states has been the right to national 
self-determination; they point to their historic links to a territory and their well-
developed, common identity. As it reads in Abkhaziaʹs 1999 declaration of in-
dependence,  
we appeal to the UN, OSCE, and to all States of the world to recognise the independ-
ent State created by the people of Abkhazia on the basis of the right of nations to free 
self-determination.5  
However, even in the heyday of self-determination after the First World War, 
the principle was not systematically applied. The right to self-determination 
runs up against the principle of territorial integrity and it usually loses out; sov-
ereignty trumps self-determination. The primary exception post-1945 has been 
in cases of decolonisation, or more specifically salt-water colonialism. Scott 
Pegg argues that the process of decolonisation resulted in a new basis for state 
recognition. As it reads in United Nations (UN) resolution 1514,  
inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never 
serve as a pretext for delaying independence.6  
Independence is, consequently, a moral entitlement,7 or in the words of Robert 
Jackson, ʺTo be a sovereign state today one needs only to have been a formal 
colony yesterday.ʺ8 Decolonisation thus constitutes a departure from previous 
criteria for recognition, such as viability. Moreover, recognition followed the for-
mer colonial borders not national or ethnic identities (the principle of uti possi-
                                                          
3 Paul R WILIAMS/Francesa Jannotti PECCI, »Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap 
Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination«, in: Stanford Journal of International 
Law, 40 (2004) 1, pp. 1–40, pp. 1–2, available at  
<http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/reports/stanfordearnedsov.pdf>.  
4 Dov LYNCH, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States, Washington DC: United States In-
stitute of Peace, 2004, p. 18. 
5 Act of State Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia, 12 October 1999, available at 
<http://www.unpo.org/content/view/705/236/>. 
6 Quoted in Scott PEGG, International Society and the De Facto State, Aldershot: Ash-
gate, 1998, p. 127. 
7 Ibid., p. 3. 
8 Robert H. JACKSON, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 17. 
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detis); it is a constricted, non-ethnic form of self-determination. It does, there-
fore, not set a useful precedent for ethnically-based secessionist movements 
without a colonial past. 
In a time of territorial integrity, arguments for recognition that are purely 
based on national self-determination are, therefore, fighting a losing battle. It 
seems that the leaders of aspiring states have realised this. They, consequently, 
combine national self-determination arguments, focused on groupness and his-
toric continuity, with a claim to a ʹremedialʹ right to secession, arguing that the 
ʹparent stateʹ denied them civil and political rights and that they were subjected 
to egregious abuses.9 The proclamation of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, for 
example, stressed the alleged ʺpolicy of apartheid and discrimination pursued 
in Azerbaijan.ʺ10 As a possible precedent, the entities can point to Bangladesh, 
which was recognised, in part, due to severe human rights violations; it was 
deemed to be a situation of a gross failure of the duties of the state. This was, 
however, not turned into a coherent doctrine of recognition, which would have 
resulted in the right to self-determination for a high number of secessionist re-
gions. It was treated as an exception and territorial integrity remained the de-
fining principle of the international system. Even the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the recognition of a large number 
of new states failed to alter this state of affairs. The International Community 
primarily adopted a reactive position when it came to the recognition of the 
states emerging from the two multinational federations. As the conflicts intensi-
fied, there was a steady movement away from the principle of territorial integ-
rity and towards the recognition of new states. This movement reflected an at-
tempt to ensure stability but it was couched in the language of international 
practice and state sovereignty. Recognition did not only reflect facts on the 
ground and an important limit was put in place: only former republics would 
be recognised as independent states.11 This had important implications for eth-
nically-defined entities that were proclaimed during the intensification of the 
conflict and did not enjoy the status of a republic; internal borders had replaced 
external ones as the basis for territorial integrity.  
                                                          
9  For further analysis of this principle see, for example, Michael SCHARF, »Earned 
Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings«, in: Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy, 31 (2004) 3, pp. 373–387, p. 382. 
10  Declaration on Proclamation of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, 2 September 1991, 
available at <http://www.nkr.am/en/declaration/10/> 
11  James GOW, Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav 
War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 76. 
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On 17 December 1991, in a bid to stop the ongoing war in Croatia and the 
threatening war in Bosnia, the European Community (EC) invited the republics 
seeking independence to submit applications for recognition. These applica-
tions would be assessed by the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia, also known as the Badinter Commission, which was to publish its 
legal opinion a month later. The guidelines issued by the EC affirmed a readi-
ness for recognition of the republics ʺsubject to the normal standards of interna-
tional practice and the political realities in each caseʺ but also warned that the 
EC ʺwill not recognise entities which are the result of aggression.ʺ This warning 
appears to have concerned the self-proclaimed Serb entities.12 The Serb Auton-
omous Region of Krajina (SAO Krajina) had in March 1991 declared its separa-
tion from Croatia and was shortly followed by the self-proclaimed Serb 
autonomous regions in Western and Eastern Slavonia. In Bosnia, the so-called 
Serb Assembly in November 1991 proclaimed as part of Yugoslavia all munici-
palities, local communities and populated places in which over 50% of the Serbs 
had voted for this option in a preceding referendum. Despite the warning con-
tained in the EC guidelines, these Serb statelets also made claims to sover-
eignty. Thus, on 19 December 1991 the Serb leadership in Krajina (Croatia) pro-
claimed the Republic of Serb Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina, RSK); they 
could now argue that they enjoyed republican status (albeit unrecognised) and 
submitted an application for recognition. Similarly, the Serb Assembly on 21 
December 1991 announced the formation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Srpska Republika Bosna i Hercegovina, later renamed Republika 
Srpska) and on 9 January 1992 its independence was proclaimed.13 A formal 
application for recognition was, however, not submitted in this case.  
If the self-proclaimed republics had hoped for international support, they 
were left disappointed when the Badinter Commission handed down its opin-
ions. The Commission found that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution 
and that sovereignty rested with the republics, not with the ethno-nations as 
argued by the Serbs. It thus argued that the principle of uti possidetis was appli-
cable and advised that ʺthe former [republican] borders acquire the character of 
boundaries protected by international law.ʺ14 The principle of uti possidetis was 
seen to have ensured stability following decolonisation in Africa and the hope 
was that it would do the same for – the now former – Yugoslavia. The EC there-
                                                          
12 Enver HASANI, Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and International Stability: The 
Case of Yugoslavia, Vienna: National Defence Academy, 2003, p. 173. 
13 Steven L. BURG/Paul S. SHOUP, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and 
International Intervention, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 97. 
14 GOW, Triumph of the Lack of Will (above fn. 11), p. 74–75 
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fore refused to accept applications for recognition submitted by the Krajina 
Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians.15 The decision implied that ethnic self-
determination had a place but only within states;16 in the form of minority 
rights and protections, which the Commission argued should be a condition for 
recognition, along with democracy and the rule of law. This was an attempt to 
base recognition on territoriality rather than on ethnicity; it was argued that the 
ʹparent stateʹ had dissolved, thus it was not a case of recognising ethno-national 
secessions. It could therefore be argued that no precedent had been set for rec-
ognising de facto states resulting from ethno-national movements – even if the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia had very clearly been driven by such sentiments. 
Other territorial entities were consequently denied recognition; Kosovo had 
sought to argue for equal status, but this was not supported by the Commis-
sion.17 The Serb statelets in Croatia and Bosnia had an even weaker case and 
were denied any legitimate claim to sovereignty: they had not been units in the 
Yugoslav Federation; they made overtly ethnic claims to self-determination and 
they were seen to be based on aggression. The case for non-recognition was 
thus based on the principle of territorial integrity, and its internal substitute uti 
possidetis, but was reinforced by the strategy used by these entities in their bid 
for independence and recognition. This is a pattern seen in other de facto states 
as well; the case for non-recognition is strengthened by their overwhelmingly 
negative image.   
Criminalised, Aggressive, Ethnic Fiefdoms 
De facto states tend to be ethnically-defined and born out of violence and the 
image that dominates in the media, in foreign ministries and in the limited aca-
demic literature is very much a negative one. These entities are commonly 
viewed as criminalised, ethnic fiefdoms which are founded on aggression and 
frequently also on ethnic cleansing. Vladimir Kolossov and John OʹLoughlin,18 
for example, argue that de facto states are  
predicated on criminal or quasi-criminal organisations, frequently specialising in the 
                                                          
15 BURG/SHOUP, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (above fn. 13), p. 96. 
16 GOW, Triumph of the Lack of Will (above fn. 11), p. 74. 
17 Ibid., p. 75, fn. 26. 
18 Vladimir KOLOSSOV/John OʹLOUGHLIN, »Pseudo-States as Harbingers of a New 
Geopolitics: The Example of the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic (TMR)«, in: 
David NEWMAN (ed.), Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, London: Frank Cass, 
1999, pp. 151–176, p. 152, available at   
<http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/PEC/johno/pub/pseudo-states_1999.pdf>.  
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production and sale of drugs, as well as the illegal traffic of weapons and in the launder-
ing of ʹdirty moneyʹ.  
Other analysts add human trafficking and the smuggling of radioactive mate-
rial to this list of security threats.19 Such sentiments are echoed by the ʹparent 
statesʹ of these entities who describe them as little more than criminalised bad-
lands; as Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, puts it, Abkhaziaʹs leaders 
ʺhave profited from illegal smuggling and contraband [and] now threaten to 
draw us all into conflict.ʺ20 As Lynch argues, de facto states are typically dis-
missed as criminal strips of no-manʹs land or as the, likewise criminalised, pup-
pets of external states;21 Serbia in the case of Republika Srpska and Republika 
Srpska Krajina; Russia in the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria; 
Turkey in the case of Northern Cyprus; Armenia in the case of Nagorno Kara-
bakh etc. Amitai Etzioni, moreover, dismisses the claim that such separatist 
movements are based on popular will, ʺa bunch of local autocrats hardly consti-
tutes progress toward genuine self-determination.ʺ22 Similarly, Walter Kemp 
describes their claim to independence as ʹselfish determinationʹ and contends,  
[…] in many cases the intractability of these conflicts has more to do with the inability 
to break vested interests than with the difficulty of brokering a political settlement.23  
                                                          
The dominance of this negative image undermines any claim for recogni-
tion; it is not only a question of the inviolability of borders, the statelets are 
deemed undesirable entities that lack legitimacy and constitute a security threat. 
As argued elsewhere,24 this image appears to be overplayed but it has had a 
significant impact on the international responses to these entities and on their 
revised strategies for gaining recognition.  
19 Alexandre KUKHIANIDZE/Alexandre KUPATADZE/Roman GOTSIRIDZE, Smuggling 
through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region, Tbilisi: Transnational Crime and Corrup-
tion Center (TraCCC), 2004, pp. 31, 36.  
20 Quoted in Charles KING, »Black Sea Blues«, in: The National Interest, 78 (2004) 5, 
pp. 144–147. 
21 LYNCH, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States (above fn. 4), p. 4. 
22 Amitai ETZIONI, »The Evils of Self-Determination«, in: Foreign Policy, 89 (Winter 
1992/93), pp. 21–35. 
23 Walter KEMP, »Selfish Determination: The Questionable Ownership of Autonomy 
Movements«, in: Ethnopolitics, 4 (2005) 1, pp. 85–104, pp. 88–89. 
24 Nina CASPERSEN, »Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus«, in: Survival, 50 
(August-September 2008) 4, (forthcoming).  
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Dealing With De Facto States 
Following from this image of de facto states and the rejection of their claims for 
recognition, one would expect a great reluctance to engage with their lead-
erships. And this has indeed been the dominant international response. Prag-
matic considerations have at times led to some forms of reluctant engagement, 
but the guiding principle has been territorial integrity and the disinclination to 
defy the ʹparent statesʹ has been considerable. Moreover, the authorities have 
almost exclusively been viewed through the lens of ethnicity and monolithic 
representation, with no understanding of more complex dynamics. One de fac-
to state, however, constitutes an exception to the general picture of internation-
al isolation: the case of Kosovo. This case differs in important respects due to 
the NATO intervention in 1999 and the subsequent establishment of an interna-
tional administration; international intervention, in effect, created the de facto 
state of Kosovo. It could, therefore, be argued that Kosovo cannot really be 
grouped with other de facto states; the international presence, for example, 
greatly minimised Kosovoʹs internal sovereignty but it also made the entityʹs 
existence less precarious.25 Even so, the policies adopted for Kosovo have been 
followed with intense interest in other de facto states and it has affected their 
strategies for achieving recognition; this tendency has only been strengthened 
by the recent recognition of Kosovoʹs unilateral declaration of independence.  
Serb Statelets in War-Time Croatia and Bosnia: Reluctant Engagement 
The leaders of the self-proclaimed Serb statelets, Republika Srpska Krajina 
(RSK) and Republika Srpska (RS) were from the beginning regarded as the pro-
tégés or puppets of Slobodan Milošević; the ethnic definition of the war had 
been accepted and the Serbian President could, therefore, be regarded as speak-
ing for all Serbs. In addition, there was often a reluctance to engage with the  
local Serb leaders who were considered unpredictable and often crude. Initially, 
Milošević therefore played the dominant role in international negotiations, even 
those directly involving the Serb statelets. Thus, the Vance Plan for Croatia was 
                                                          
25 Pål Kolstø, moreover, characterises Kosovo as a borderline case since he argues 
that it had not, at the time, formally declared independence. Pål KOLSTØ, »The 
Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States«, in: Journal of Peace Re-
search, 43 (2006) 6, pp. 723–740. However, independence was in fact declared al-
ready in 1990, so it is only the international presence that constitutes a significant 
difference from the other de facto states. Thanks to Denisa Kostovicova for alert-
ing me to this point  
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negotiated without the participation of the local Serb leaders. Such marginalisa-
tion of the local leaders was based on an assumption of either intra-Serb con-
sensus or on Belgradeʹs ability to dictate its position to the Croatian and Bos-
nian Serbs. However, events were soon to demonstrate that such consensus or 
control could not always be assumed. Miloševićʹs regime in Serbia initially en-
joyed an almost symbiotic relationship with radical Serb leaders in Croatia and 
Bosnia, but relations underwent a considerable change over the years and from 
being loyal supporters of the Serbian President, the local leaders became in-
creasingly autonomous actors who were at times in direct conflict with Bel-
grade.26 Based on such conflicts, and the position of the local leaders as poten-
tial veto players, it was therefore problematic to assign the Serb statelets to the 
status of pariahs and insist on complete marginalisation. Pragmatism prevailed 
when their acceptance of peace proposals was deemed necessary. Thus, there 
was a considerable change from the London Conference in 1992 when the Bos-
nian Serb leaders were not even official participants27 to later peace talks when 
they played a central, and frequently obstructing, role. This emergence from the 
shadow of Milošević was necessary to ensure a viable settlement, but it also 
benefited the Serbian President as it allowed for responsibility to be shared.28 
This set-up, however, began to change in July 1995 when Ratko Mladić and 
Radovan Karadžić were indicted for war crimes. These indictments added to 
the marginalisation of the local Serb leaders which international mediators had 
tried to foster for some time; the Bosnian Serb leaders, the following month, 
signed the so-called Patriarch Paper which gave Milošević the deciding vote in 
a joint Serb delegation. The reluctant engagement could, consequently, be scaled 
back significantly. Mladić and Karadžić would be prevented from taking part in 
the upcoming Dayton talks due to their indictments; as Richard Holbrooke, the 
US envoy, put it to Milošević, ʺUnder international law they will be arrested if 
they set foot on the soil of the United States or any member of the E.U.ʺ29 The de 
facto president of the Croatian Serbs, Milan Martić, had also been indicted, but 
following the fall of Krajina in August 1995, the RSK was no longer a central 
concern; the leaders of the Croatian territories that remained under Serb control 
were now willing to negotiate the dissolution of their de facto state. In the run-
                                                          
26 Nina CASPERSEN, »Between Puppets and Independent Actors: Kin-State Involve-
ment in the Conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia and Nagorno Karabakh«, in: Ethnopolitics, 
(forthcoming, 2008).  
27 Laura SILBER/Allan LITTLE, The Death of Yugoslavia, London: Penguin Books, 1996, 
p. 262. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Richard HOLBROOKE, To End a War, New York, NY: Modern Library, 1999, p. 107. 
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up to the Dayton Peace Agreement, limited engagement with the Bosnian Serb 
leaders continued, but the international mediators insisted anew on perceiving 
the leaders of the de facto entities as Belgradeʹs puppets; pragmatic considera-
tions still led to willingness to talk to them but the intra-Serb dynamics had 
changed and their self-proclaimed independent status held less and less sway. 
Holbrooke describes how he agonised over whether or not to meet Mladić and 
Karadžić in September 1995: ʺBut in the end I decided it was justifiable under 
these circumstances.ʺ It was considered acceptable as long as it would help the 
negotiations. However, he made it a condition that they did not present them-
selves as a separate delegation or tried to negotiate on their own; to Milošević 
he stated: ʺthey must be part of your delegation, you must lead the discussions 
and you must control them.ʺ30  
While their demands for recognition were dismissed as illegitimate, there 
was consequently a reluctant acceptance to engage with these entities, or rather 
their leaderships, in negotiations. This is, however, as far as the engagement 
went and it only lasted for as long as it was deemed necessary; for as long as 
they could be regarded as veto players. Any other engagement was regarded as 
strictly depoliticised and was limited to humanitarian aid and impartial peace 
keeping in the entities. No attempts were made to engage with, and try to take 
advantage of, internal dynamics in the statelets; beyond some recognition of a 
brewing conflict between the military and civilian leadership. Otherwise, 
monolithic representation was accepted.31 The international mediators pre-
ferred to deal with leaders of recognised entities and accepted a purely ethnic 
definition of the war according to which these leaders could speak for all their 
co-ethnics. The reluctance to engage with these entities was, at least initially, 
based on a refusal to accept their ethnically-based claims and a fear of being 
seen to be rewarding aggression and ethnic cleansing. However, ethnically-
defined solutions were eventually accepted and Republika Srpska was recog-
nised as a constituent entity of Bosnia with considerable levels of autonomy. 
Yet the Serb insistence on the right to ethnically-defined self-determination did 
not result in independence, despite their overwhelming coercive powers at the 
beginning of the war and early military success. Other de facto states appear to 
have taken note of this experience and have most notably tried to alter their neg-
ative image; first in the hope that an exception from the principle of territorial 
integrity could be made and later in the hope that a new precedent has been set.  
                                                          
30 Ibid., pp. 148–149. 
31 For an analysis of internal dynamics in Republika Srpska, see Nina CASPERSEN, 
»Contingent Nationalist Dominance: Intra-Serb Challenges to the Serb Democratic 
Party«, in: Nationalities Papers, 34 (2006) 1, pp. 51–69. 
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De Facto States in the Caucasus: Depoliticised, Limited Engagement 
There are currently three entities in the Caucasus that can be described as de 
facto states: South Ossetia (Georgia), Abkhazia (Georgia), and Nagorno Kara-
bakh (Azerbaijan). These entities have enjoyed de facto independence since the 
early 1990s but lack international recognition. They share a number of similari-
ties with the Serb statelets analysed above; they all resulted from conflicts 
which took place in a transitional context following, or accompanying, the dis-
integration of a multiethnic federation. Furthermore, they all involved a ʹstrand-
ed minorityʹ that expressed demands for joining its kin-state, or alternatively 
becoming independent. Finally, they made similar claims to independence, 
based on self-determination and popular will; the use of referenda was popular 
in all cases. These similarities were recognised in the mid-1990s when Arkady 
Ghukasian, then foreign minister of Nagorno Karabakh (NK), stated: ʺI think 
the Serbs […] are very close to receiving their desired goals. Of course, this will 
have an effect on the status of Karabagh.ʺ32 There are, however, also some im-
portant differences. Firstly, the Caucasus entities can point to a pre-war consti-
tutional status which was lacking in the case of the Serb statelets: Abkhazia was 
an autonomous republic in the Soviet Union while South Ossetia and Nagorno 
Karabakh were autonomous regions. Their status was therefore more akin to 
that of Kosovo, although they were not identical. Secondly, at least two of the 
Caucasus entities, Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh, are more ʹstate-likeʹ than 
the Serb statelets ever managed to become; they have existed for longer, during 
periods of relative stability, and have made some progress when it comes to in-
stitution-building. The Serb statelets, in comparison, struggled to create even 
the most rudimentary institutions; the economy, insofar as one existed, was al-
most entirely based on smuggling and other forms of war profiteering; factional 
conflicts were prominent and the authorities lacked full control over the terri-
tory to which they lay claim.33  
When it comes to institution-building, Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh 
have arguably been more successful than Kosovo, despite the international 
presence in Kosovo and the very substantial financial support made available 
to the province. In comparison, the de facto states in the Caucasus have hardly 
                                                          
32 Alexander MURINSON, »The Secession of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh. The 
Roots and Patterns of Development of Post-Soviet Micro-Secessions in Transcau-
casia«, in: Central Asia Survey 23 (2004) 1, pp. 5–26, p. 6. 
33 See, for example, Filip ŠVARM, »The Untouchable Dealers«, in: Vreme News Digest, 
27 September 1993; IDEM, »The Krajina Economy«, in: Vreme News Digest, 15 August 
1994; Miloš VASIĆ, »Imitating life«, in: Vreme News Digest, 4 November 1991.  
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seen any international engagement at all. Territorial integrity has guided and 
restricted any form of engagement and the arguments of the ʹparent statesʹ have 
largely been accepted: the entities are illegal, they represent a de facto occupa-
tion, they are based on ethnic cleansing and their leaderships lack any popular 
legitimacy. Thus, international engagement is only undertaken if explicitly ap-
proved, or even requested, by the ʹparent statesʹ. In Abkhazia, the European 
Union (EU) and other international organisations have, for example, provided 
humanitarian aid and support for civil society development. These projects are 
encouraged by the Georgian Government, which hopes to counteract Russian 
influence in the entity and improve the prospect for a settlement.34 This ap-
proach is deliberately depoliticised;35 the international organisations do not en-
gage with the Abkhaz authorities and the involvement can therefore largely be 
framed as an issue of human security and grassroots developments. Even the 
latter is limited and few projects have supported the rule of law, free media or a 
critical civil society.36 Any actions or any contacts that could be seen to legiti-
mise the existence of the de facto states, or their leaderships, and hence violate 
the principle of territorial integrity, are fiercely resisted. Involvement in internal 
political processes is ruled out in particular, and the legitimacy of elections is 
routinely denied.37 The EU, despite its increasing involvement in the Caucasus, 
has had virtually no projects in Nagorno Karabakh, which is in large parts ex-
plained by Azerbaijanʹs strong discouragement of any involvement in the en-
tity. However, the lack of engagement continues even though the Baku Gov-
ernment has now suggested that it might be willing to modify its approach.38  
The de facto states are, therefore, confined to a pariah status reinforced by 
trade blockades, lack of possibility for international loans or any form of inter-
national assistance; beyond the, often very significant, assistance provided by 
their ʹpatron statesʹ, Russia in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Armenia 
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in the case of Nagorno Karabakh. Otherwise, the only engagement consists of 
peace talks under international auspices; pragmatism dictates that the leader-
ships of the self-proclaimed entities take part in such talks, just like they did in 
the former Yugoslavia. However, Nagorno Karabakh is even excluded from 
this. Azerbaijan had in 1994 accepted Nagorno Karabakh as a military party to 
the war and therefore accepted its involvement in the ceasefire talks; however, 
it now insists on framing the conflict as a case of Armenian irredentism and will 
therefore only accept Armenia as an interlocutor. This has been accepted by the 
international mediators, even though the Karabakh leaders have shown them-
selves as veto players in past negotiations.  
The self-proclaimed states are rarely actively opposed – travel bans are not 
imposed, the ʹparent statesʹ do not receive military backing – they are rather  
ignored; they are not part of the exclusive ʹclub of independent statesʹ and there 
is great reluctance to engage in any activity that could be seen as endorsing 
them. Moreover, there appears to be a fear of becoming enmeshed in unre-
solved conflicts. However, the principle of territorial integrity can sometimes be 
trumped by other interests. For example, Somaliland has seen more interna-
tional involvement than any of the other de facto states; due to its strategic posi-
tion on the Horn of Africa, fear of instability, and arguably due to the lack of 
effective opposition from the ʹparent stateʹ Somalia. The question is, however, if 
the realm of internationally acceptable solutions has changed since the mid-
1990s? The leaders of the Serb statelets were included in international peace 
talks in the 1990s, but it was always made clear that the basis for any solution 
would have to be the territorial integrity of the republics; even though the Z4 
plan, proposed for Croatia in early 1995, and the Dayton Agreement, adopted 
in late 1995, promised very extensive autonomy. In comparison, the recent 
peace talks over Nagorno Karabakh reportedly proposed a status referendum 
in the entity, following an interim period of 10–15 years, which would almost 
guarantee a vote for independence.39 Likewise, a number of suggestions have 
been made for forms of shared sovereignty in the case of Abkhazia. For exam-
ple, the 1999, UN-prepared ʹBoden Paperʹ envisioned ʹsovereigntyʹ for Abkhazia 
inside a Georgian state. In 2004, a more detailed proposal by a group of inde-
pendent Georgian experts suggested that Abkhazia be given ʺdomestic sover-
eigntyʺ according to which it would be considered an ʺequal and independent 
                                                          
39 See, for example, Harry TAMRAZIAN, »Officials Say Karabakh Deal Close at Hand«, 
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partner, with a stateʹs qualities and characteristics.ʺ40 The lengthy situation of 
ʹno war, no peace,ʹ the entrenchment of the de facto independence and the 
stalled peace talks all spur the need for more creative solutions. 
Pragmatism may, therefore, trump or mediate territorial integrity; so far, 
however, this remains conditioned on acceptance by the ʹparent statesʹ. But the 
de facto states perceive that this may not necessarily be required in the future, 
and they take their cue from the recent recognition of Kosovo which has reig-
nited their own hopes for external sovereignty: the international recognition of 
a province against the expressed wish of the ʹparent stateʹ and significant inter-
national actors. This recognition was made conditional on the establishment of 
a democratic state that guarantees the protection of minority rights. The de 
facto states assert that this sets an important precedent and even before the rec-
ognition they argued that it would have significant implications. Thus, the 
president of Nagorno Karabakh, Arkady Ghukasian, stated,  
If the world community is ready to recognize the independence of […] Kosovo, I think 
it will be very hard for them to explain why they donʹt recognize Nagorno-Karabakh 
[…].41.  
His counterpart in Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, similarly argued,  
If the issue of Kosovo is settled [in favour of independence], letʹs say, and not the 
issue of Abkhazia, that is a policy purely of double standards.42  
They contend that Kosovoʹs recognition constitutes a departure from the prin-
ciples that have hitherto formed the basis of the recognition of new states.  
Kosovo has long been of interest to the de facto states in the Caucasus: a de 
facto independent entity under international administration with an unresolved 
status. The international policy regarding Kosovo and especially the 2003 ʹstan-
dards before statusʹ policy caught the interest of the entities; it seemed to sug-
gest that recognition might be awarded to entities that had succeeded in build-
ing effective, democratic institutions. Partly in response to this, the leaderships 
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of the entities, therefore, began to emphasise their success in state-building and 
in democratisation; these arguments gradually began to dominate over past 
claims to groupness and grievances. They argued that they have earned their 
sovereignty; they have proven their viability as effective, democratic entities.43 
This hope for a changed basis of external sovereignty finds support in an argu-
ment in the globalisation literature which holds that sovereignty has increas-
ingly been redefined as legitimate authority based on the maintenance of hu-
man rights and democracy.44 However, with Kosovoʹs recognition ʹstandards 
before statusʹ has become ʹstatus then standardsʹ (under international supervi-
sion), which suggests a different basis for international recognition. So what 
impact is this likely to have: in the de facto states and in the ʹparent statesʹ? 
How will it affect their willingness to compromise on a settlement? How will it 
impact on the legitimising strategies adopted by the entities?  
Impact of Kosovoʹs Independence? 
Following the breakdown of talks on Kosovoʹs status in December 2007, it was 
clear that a unilateral declaration of independence was only a matter of time. 
This came on 17 February 2008 presumably after the Kosovar leaders had re-
ceived a green light from their strongest international backers, the US. Kosovoʹs 
independence was quickly recognised by the US and the UK, who were soon 
followed by most of the EU. The states that have recognised Kosovo have all 
maintained that this is a unique case: Kosovo is an exception, no precedent for 
recognition has been set, territorial integrity still prevails. As Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, the EU external relations commissioner put it, ʺKosovo is not a blue-
print that can be applied to any other area.ʺ45 Similarly, Javier Solana, the EUʹs 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, argued that 
Kosovo is a sui generis situation, ʺthis is so evident that those who donʹt see it, 
donʹt see it because they donʹt want to.ʺ46 The EU Council reiterated its adher-
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ence to the principle of territorial integrity and argued that the case of Kosovo is 
unique in view of two factors: the international administration established by 
Security Council Resolution 1244 and ʺthe conflict of the 1990s.ʺ47 Regarding the 
latter argument it has previously been argued that Kosovoʹs recognition could 
be seen as the final step in the Yugoslaviaʹs dissolution, but the EU now primar-
ily seems to refer to the ethnic cleansing committed by Miloševićʹs regime.48 In 
addition to these arguments for uniqueness, the EU also emphasised that the 
resolution adopted by the Kosovo Assembly  
commits Kosovo to the principles of democracy and equality of all its citizens, the pro-
tection of the Serbs and other minorities […] and international supervision.49 
However, not everyone agrees that the recognition of Kosovo does not set a 
precedent and judging from reactions in de facto states in the Caucasus, and 
elsewhere, significant political consequences are to be expected. Russia, in par-
ticular, has argued that the recognition of Kosovo sets a dangerous precedent. 
A number of Russian politicians actively advocate unilateral recognition of Ab-
khazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, and Kosovoʹs recognition might provide 
a useful window of opportunity.50 One Russian MP, Aleksey Ostrovskiy, quick-
ly announced that ʺthe recognition of Kosovo allows Abkhazia and South Os-
setia to expect a similar decision in respect of their territories.ʺ51 However, the 
Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, denied that such recognition was part 
of Russiaʹs agenda;52 the Russian Government seems to relish the opportunity 
to claim that it, unlike the West, seeks to uphold international law and the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity. Steps short of recognition therefore appear more 
likely. The Duma speaker, Boris Gruzlov, stated that in view of Kosovoʹs recog-
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nition, the Government should ʺreshape its relations with the self-proclaimed 
republics;ʺ53 there is speculation that Russia will open representations in Ab-
khazia and South Ossetia54 and it was announced in early March 2008 that sanc-
tions against Abkhazia would be lifted.55 This is in some ways merely a formali-
sation of existing relationships; the blockade has never been effectively en-
forced and Russia constitutes a very significant external backer to the entities.  
Moscow Times has argued that the recognition of Kosovo may force Krem-
lin to take a clearer stand: 
It is becoming increasingly difficult for Russia to offer tacit support for separatist re-
gimes while officially backing the territorial integrity of former Soviet republics.56  
However, ambiguity so far persists even though the recent moves signal a 
weakened commitment to territorial integrity; these moves are easier to justify 
following Kosovoʹs recognition and there is a fear in the ʹparent statesʹ that this 
new position will be used to blackmail them. Such intentions could be deduced 
from Vladimir Putinʹs somewhat cryptic response when asked if Russia would 
consider recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia,  
If someone takes a bad, incorrect decision, it does not mean that we should act the sa-
me way. But […] we would respond to the behaviour of our partners in order to en-
sure that our interests are protected. If they believe that they have the right to pro-
mote their interests in this way, then why canʹt we?57  
In a similar vein, Russiaʹs ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, has warned 
that if Georgia were to join NATO, Abkhazia and South Ossetia would begin 
ʺreal secession.ʺ58 Thus, Russia argues that a dangerous precedent has been set, 
but that it will not act on it. This position appears to, in part, reflect Russiaʹs 
own problems with potential secessions and, in part, reflect the potential strate-
gic use of a continued ambiguous position. It is important to remember that ar-
guments over whether or not a precedent has been set are ultimately political 
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arguments, and depend to a large extent on whether or not the implications of 
such a precedent are seen as beneficial. Thus, it is unsurprising that the exis-
tence of a precedent is denied by the ʹparent statesʹ but eagerly claimed by de 
facto states; if the decision on Kosovoʹs status had been reintegration with Ser-
bia, then the positions would undoubtedly have been reversed. But this ex-
pected pattern of responses does not mean that Kosovoʹs independence will not 
have an impact on the self-proclaimed entities or on their ʹparent statesʹ.  
The de facto states are basically arguing: ʺif Kosovo then why not us?ʺ They 
point to their former status as provinces in now dissolved states; alleged human 
rights abuses; the right to national self-determination and what they argue to be 
their proven viability as effective, democratic states. These arguments are not 
limited to the Caucasus, but also heard in other secessionist conflicts.59 Ab-
khazia and South Ossetia are the two entities that have most eagerly jumped at 
this chance for renewing their claims to independence. Thus, at a joint press 
conference on 18 February 2008, the leaders of the two entities announced that 
they would shortly apply to the leadership of Russia, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the UN and other international organisations to recognise 
their independence.60 These applications were duly submitted the following 
month. However, the leaders also expressed a certain scepticism regarding the 
likely international response. Thus, Yury Morozov, the prime minister of South 
Ossetia, stated:  
Weʹve got used to the double standards of the West. I believe that the people of South 
Ossetia have much more reason for gaining independence than the Kosovan Alba-
nians.61  
And the entityʹs president declared:  
Abkhazia and South Ossetia will move toward independence step by step, in accor-
dance with international law. We have our speed, independent of Kosovo.62  
Compared to these two entities, the leadership of Nagorno Karabakh has  
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been remarkably subdued. The NK foreign minister, Georgy Petrossian, stated 
in an interview in early February 2008, when asked about Kosovo,  
all of them [the de facto states] have a number of identical parameters, so the set-
tlement of any one of them […] would have certain political and legal consequences 
for the others.  
He also added that the determining contemporary criterion for recognition 
is viability: ʺthe ability of these states to ensure security and protect the rights of 
their citizens.ʺ63 Nevertheless, no official reactions to Kosovoʹs independence 
were issued, no press conferences were held. The celebrations of the 20th anni-
versary of the Karabakh Movement, a few days after Kosovoʹs recognition, 
were used to reiterate the case for independence but few explicit references to 
Kosovo were made. The leaders of Nagorno Karabakh have previously ex-
pressed their interest in Kosovo due to the prospect of recognition in defiance 
of the ʹparent stateʹ, but have also maintained that they have an even better case 
for recognition than Kosovo.64 Perhaps they now fear being lumped together 
with the other de facto states, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, perceiving 
that this could reduce their chance of recognition.  
Nevertheless, this reignited optimism in the self-proclaimed states has been 
mirrored by fears in their ʹparent statesʹ, which have argued that Kosovoʹs rec-
ognition might be misused. This argument is especially heard in Georgia. Al-
though relations between Russia and Georgia have recently improved there is a 
fear that Russia will use the alleged precedent set by Kosovoʹs independence to 
further its influence in the region. Thus, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili 
rejected the idea that Kosovo sets a precedent, but warned that it could be used 
to fan tensions in Abkhazia.65 The speaker of the Georgian parliament, Nino 
Burjanadze, likewise dismissed any comparison with Kosovo as ʺcompletely 
groundless and completely unacceptable.ʺ66 Azerbaijan similarly fears the con-
sequences of Kosovoʹs recognition and the authorities reacted angrily to the an-
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nouncement; President Aliyev declared that it emboldened the Karabakh sepa-
ratists and the Parliament voted to withdraw a 33-strong Azeri peacekeeping 
team that had been serving in Kosovo since 1999.67  
Impact on Peace Processes 
Regardless of whether or not Kosovoʹs independence sets a legal precedent, it 
has already had political consequences which may start unravelling the current 
stalemates; it introduces a new dynamism which makes the status quo increas-
ingly unstable. This could both hinder and aid the goal of a peaceful solution; a 
lot depends on how the (political) precedent set by Kosovo is managed. As 
Thomas de Waal puts it, ʺEvents set precedents, whether international leaders 
like it or not.ʺ68 If this is not acknowledged and managed then the de facto 
states in the Caucasus might learn the wrong lessons from Kosovoʹs recogni-
tion.  
Some observers argue that Kosovoʹs independence will lead to a hardening 
of positions. For example, Oksana Antonenko holds that it makes the de facto 
regimes less flexible in negotiations;69 independence now appears increasingly 
realistic and they therefore see less need to backtrack on their maximalist goals. 
As Charles King has put it, ʺWhy be a mayor of a small city if you can be presi-
dent of a country?ʺ70 This is not just the dream of aspiring separatists, this is the 
current reality, and the perception is that this reality is increasingly likely to be 
internationally recognised. When it comes to the ʹparent statesʹ, it has also been 
argued that they will now be less likely to compromise. Antonenko again ar-
gues that Kosovoʹs recognition encourages efforts to restore territorial integrity 
since a potential Russian response is feared.71 Thus, if the ʹparent statesʹ fear los-
ing their territory altogether then it makes a military solution appear all the 
more attractive. Such ominous tendencies appear to have been borne out by the 
recent statement from Azerbaijanʹs President who announced that Azerbaijan 
was ready to take Nagorno Karabakh back by force if need be and was buying 
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military equipment and arms in preparation.72 The same day saw unusually 
violent clashes across the ceasefire line and these were in Karabakh argued to 
reflect Azerbaijanʹs fears of a Kosovo precedent.73 The possibility of similar 
preferences for a military ʹsolutionʹ in the case of Georgia is strengthened by the 
current instability in the country and by increasing hardline dominance in  
Saakashviliʹs cabinet; the Government has, for example, renamed its conflict 
resolution ministry into the more hawkish Ministry for Reintegration.74 
But this hardening of positions is by no means inevitable. The ʹparent statesʹ 
could also conclude that Kosovoʹs independence adds a hitherto lacking ur-
gency to the peace talks; if territorial integrity is not guaranteed then other solu-
tions, including forms of shared sovereignty, may start to appear more attrac-
tive. The leaderships of de facto states will also not necessarily take a more 
maximalist position; in fact, Kosovoʹs recognition could provide further incen-
tives for creating more democratic, inclusive entities. This could in turn bring 
new forces to power who might be more inclined to compromise. The conse-
quences of Kosovoʹs independence depend to a large extent on what lessons are 
learned; why was Kosovoʹs independence recognised? What lessons does it 
hold for other territories that are striving for recognition? Does recognition de-
pend on powerful friends; military superiority; demographic majorities; politi-
cal and economic viability; democratic principles and protection of minority 
rights; or on other factors? As De Waal argued before the recognition,  
Letʹs hope that the final-status arrangement will protect the Serb minority and make 
the Balkans more stable. An outcome that grants independence on less rigorous terms 
would merely look like a reward for Kosovoʹs loyalty to the west.75.  
To that should be added: to what extent will these conditions actually be im-
plemented during the period of ʹsupervised independenceʹ and to what extent 
are they merely rhetorical? So far the de facto states have concluded from the 
case of Kosovo that viability and democratic institutions is the key to recogni-
tion. During the last couple of years, significant internal changes have taken 
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place, most notably in Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh. These changes have 
been driven, in large parts, by a belief that democratisation will make recogni-
tion more likely. As, David Babayan, advisor to the NK president, sees it, ʺrec-
ognition will not be possible without democracy; we have to be ahead of Azer-
baijan.ʺ76  
Nagorno Karabakh has held regular elections since 1995, which have been 
deemed largely ʹfree and fairʹ by international observers, and the leadership 
continuously emphasise the entityʹs democratic credentials. For example, the 
parliament speaker argues that Karabakh has  
a serious basis for the international recognition of our sovereignty, we have held free 
elections for 16 years, law-enforcement bodies are formed, powers are divided, [the] 
army is under civil control [...].77  
                                                          
The opposition has yet to gain power through elections at the national level but 
an opposition candidate did become mayor of Stepanakert, the NK ʹcapitalʹ, in 
the 2004 local elections and the opposition, overall, secured victories in 70 per-
cent of settlements. The NK authorities note that this is unheard of in the South 
Caucasus.78 Pluralism was slower to emerge in the case of Abkhazia and the au-
thorities were, moreover, more reluctant to loosen their grip on power. The first 
president of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, was unopposed when he ran for re-
election in 1999 and the opposition withdrew most of its candidates in the 2002 
parliamentary elections in protest over the conduct of the campaign.79 How-
ever, things had changed in 2004 when the opposition candidate won the 
presidential election despite (or because of) Moscowʹs backing for the regime 
candidate. Previously, the opposition had been weak but an assortment of civil 
society organisations, the veteransʹ association, businessmen, and disgruntled 
former government ministers managed to wrest power from the incumbent re-
gime. Change in leadership through contested elections is an important aspect 
of democratisation but by no means the only one. The holding of elections has, 
76 Interview with David BABAYAN, Stepanakert, 13 September 2006. 
77 »Karabakh Has Serious Grounds for International Recognition of Sovereignty«, in: 
Karabakh Open, 20 February 2008, available at  
<http://www.karabakh-open.com/src/index.php?lang=en&nid=7849&id=3>.  
78 Interview with David BABAYAN (above fn. 76).  
79 See, for example, Inal KHASHIG, »Abkhazia: Government Poll Landslide Con-
tested«, in: IWPR, Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 119, 8 March 2002, available at 
<http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=161432&apc_state=henicrs2002>;  
FREEDOM HOUSE, »Abkhasia [Georgia] (2007)«, Freedom in the World, Country Re-
ports 2007, available at 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org./template.cfm?page=22&country=7313&year=2007>. 
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however, been accompanied by increasingly pluralistic civil society and media, 
especially in the case of Abkhazia.80 Moreover, both entities are eager to dismiss 
the image of them as mono-ethnic; especially in Abkhazia there is now an, at 
times lively, debate over what it means to be Abkhaz. These processes have 
been driven by internal pressures but also by a perception that there is an ex-
ternal incentive to democratise. There are still significant shortcomings and ob-
stacles but these processes arguably open up for new solutions; it constitutes a 
tentative move away from the military, zero-sum logic that otherwise domi-
nates these conflicts. However, it is not irreversible: transition is difficult for any 
entity, but even more so for an unrecognised one. The leaderships currently le-
gitimise their claim to independence through a narrative combining national 
self-determination, grievances and democratic viability. This narrative, how-
ever, contains a number of tensions and contradictions and depending on the 
conclusions drawn from the case of Kosovo, the proclamation of democratic 
values could therefore easily be abandoned in which case a return to strict au-
thoritarian mono-ethnicity would result.  
By rejecting the very idea of a precedent, even in the form of political con-
sequences in other conflicts, the EU has closed off such a discussion. But by do-
ing so the interpretation is left largely in the hands of Russia, which may pursue 
interests other than a peaceful outcome. Part of the problem is a very static con-
ception of intra-state conflicts in general and of self-proclaimed states in par-
ticular; there is an insufficient understanding of their internal dynamics and 
possibility for change. The de facto states in the Caucasus are in some ways 
very different from the Serb statelets from the early and mid-1990s, or indeed 
from Chechnya in the late 1990s, yet they tend to be treated according to the 
same formula. The Caucasus entities have had time to build state institutions 
and an international pressure to democratise has been perceived; this has been 
compounded by internal pressure for reform, which was largely absent in the 
more top-down Yugoslav conflict.81 The failure to recognise such fluidity and 
                                                          
80 Nicu POPESCU, Democracy in Secessionism: Transnistria and Abkhaziaʹs Domestic Poli-
cies, Budapest: Central European University, Center for Policy Studies/Open So-
ciety Institute, August 2006, p. 17, available at <http://www.policy.hu/news/ 
NPopescu-PS/22>; INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Abkhazia Today, Europe Report 
No. 176, Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG, 15 September 2006, p. 15, available at <http:// 
www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/176_abkhazia_today.pdf>; 
IDEM, Nagorno–Kara-bakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground, Europe Report No. 
166, Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG, 14 September 2005, p. 11,   
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81 For the difference between the conflicts, see for example, Stuart J. KAUFMAN,  
Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Ithaca: Cornell University 
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the insistence on understanding these conflicts through reified ethnic categories 
makes it less likely that significant changes will take hold and that a more 
peaceful solution can be found. Pragmatism, and the goal of stability, has pre-
viously characterised international engagement with de facto states. This has, 
however, been largely ad hoc, unpredictable and has lacked direction and does 
therefore not bode well for more productive developments.  
Conclusion 
International policies towards de facto states have generally been guided by the 
principle of territorial integrity; this has been the case both in the Balkans and in 
the Caucasus. Their claims to independence have been rejected as being ethni-
cally-based and in violation of the principle of uti possidetis. As a result, these 
entities have often been relegated to a form of pariah status and their isolation 
has been compounded by a frequently highly negative image; they are seen to 
be based on aggression, ethnic cleansing and a criminalised economy. While 
there is certainly some truth to this image, it has in some cases been overplayed 
and failed to acknowledge developments within these entities. International 
engagement with these de facto states has therefore been limited; any actions 
that could be seen to legitimise their existence, or that were opposed by the 
ʹparent statesʹ, have generally been resisted. Reluctant engagement has, how-
ever, occasionally occurred; in the form of humanitarian aid or participation in 
peace talks. Such engagement has been driven by pragmatism; it has been on an 
ad hoc basis, the uniqueness of the situation has frequently been stressed as has 
its depoliticised nature. International responses to de facto states have thus 
been marked by a strict dichotomy; full recognition, or no relations at all. Non-
recognition is therefore accompanied by almost complete isolation. But such a 
position overlooks the possibility for other forms of engagement, short of rec-
ognition. Rather than promoting stability, international policy towards de facto 
states could be argued to reinforce the zero-sum nature of the conflict; inde-
pendence for the de facto entity or territorial integrity for the ʹparent stateʹ are 
the only options; there is no in-between.  
However, the stalled peace processes in the Caucasus and the lengthy exis-
tence of an unstable situation of ʹno war, no peaceʹ may have led to greater 
pragmatism when it comes to the de facto states. The ʹparent statesʹ appear to 
accept greater international involvement in the entities, possibly as a counter-
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balance to their external patrons, and solutions that propose some form of 
shared sovereignty or even a form of independence are more frequently put 
forward. Such developments remain conditional on acceptance by the ʹparent 
statesʹ, but the recent recognition of Kosovoʹs independence has reignited hopes 
in other de facto states that such acceptance may not be needed. The states that 
have recognised Kosovo have been keen to stress the uniqueness of this case 
and therefore reject the argument that the recognition creates a dangerous 
precedent. However, even if this recognition does not result in a coherent prin-
ciple for state recognition, it does have political consequences that are likely to 
significantly impact on the stalled peace processes in the Caucasus. It intro-
duces a new dynamism, which could lead to a hardening of positions on both 
sides and hence increase the risk of renewed warfare. But it would be a mistake 
to see this as the only possible outcome; much depends on how the recognition 
is interpreted and by refusing to acknowledge the possibility of a political pre-
cedent, the EU and the US make it harder to manage this. If the conditional na-
ture of the independence is stressed and the implementation of democratic re-
forms and minority protections is closely monitored, then this sends an impor-
tant signal to other de facto states: that they need to move away from authori-
tarian mono-ethnicity. This has already happened to some extent in the Cauca-
sus statelets, but it is by no means irreversible. Kosovoʹs recognition could 
therefore have an important impact on the internal dynamics of these entities; 
such dynamics are usually overlooked or ignored when it comes to de facto 
states and they have also played a very limited role in the recognition of new 
states. Positive engagement does not necessitate a promise of recognition, but it 
does entail an end to unproductive isolation and a serious discussion of status.82  
                                                          
82 The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq provides an example of how interna-
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 From Kosovo to Karabakh: International Responses to De Facto States  
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
EC   European Community 
EU   European Union 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NK   Nagorno Karabakh 
NKR  Nagorno Karabakh Republic 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
RSK  Republika Srpska Krajina 
SAO  Serb Autonomous Region 
UN   United Nations 
US   United States 
